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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DARIUS DUANE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Nos. 44364, 44365 & 44366
Kootenai County Case Nos.
CR-2009-11957, CR-2015-2516
& CR-2015-4987
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Brown failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
revoking his probation, or by not further reducing the fixed portion of his aggregate
sentence pursuant to his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence?

Brown Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
In case number 44364, Brown pled guilty to burglary and, on November 10,
2009, the district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three years
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fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Brown on supervised probation for four
years. (R., pp.81-86.)
Less than eight months later, Brown’s probation officer filed a report of violation
advising the court that Brown had been “non-compliant with his probation since he was
placed on supervised probation,” and alleging that Brown had violated the conditions of
his probation by being arrested for three counts of burglary and one count of petit theft,
failing to submit to weekly drug testing on all required dates except one, failing to make
any payments toward his court-ordered financial obligations, failing to obtain
employment or enroll in an educational program, failing to participate in substance
abuse treatment, failing to provide proof of completion of a parenting class as required,
failing to provide verification that he had attended any community support groups, failing
to obtain a mental health evaluation, and using methamphetamine.

(R., pp.87-91.)

Brown admitted the allegations and the district court revoked Brown’s probation,
ordered the underlying sentence executed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.129-31,
134-36.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, on August 15, 2011, the district
court suspended Brown’s sentence and placed him on supervised probation for four
years. (R., pp.139-43.)
Brown subsequently violated his probation a second time by continuing to use
methamphetamine, associating with a known drug user, and refusing to submit to UA
testing.

(R., pp.144-47.) On April 25, 2012, the district court continued Brown on

supervised probation. (R., pp.150-51.)
Approximately six months later, Brown’s probation officer filed a report of
violation alleging that Brown had violated the conditions of his probation a third time by
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committing a battery, failing to report for supervision as directed, and violating his
curfew. (R., pp.158-60.) Brown admitted the allegations and the district court again
continued him on supervised probation, but extended the probationary period by one
year. (R., pp.175, 177-78.)
On October 28, 2014, Brown’s probation officer filed a report of violation alleging
that Brown had violated the conditions of his probation a fourth time by failing to
complete his community service hours and absconding supervision. (R., pp.184-85.)
On February 16, 2015, an officer responded to a report of a drunk driver and attempted
to stop Brown after observing him cross the fog line several times. (R., p.246.) Brown
“immediately accelerated away,” reaching speeds of 85 miles per hour and running
numerous stop signs. (R., p.246.) The officer discontinued the pursuit after Brown
crossed into the State of Washington and “fled into the forest.” (R., p.246.) The state
charged Brown with felony eluding, with a persistent violator enhancement, in case
number 44366. (R., pp.255-56.)
On February 19, 2015, officers responded “to a tip” that “wanted fugitive” Brown,
who “had a confirmed felony warrant and was listed as the suspect in two multi state
felony pursuits in the past week,” “was seen in the area.” (R., p.200.) When Brown
spotted the officers, he “immediately ran from [them] by recklessly driving his vehicle in
excess of 60 and 70 miles per hour … through several private roads and through the
yard of a residence until he drove into [a] wooded area.” (R., p.200.) During the
pursuit, an officer’s vehicle “was damaged just prior to Brown driving his vehicle into a
large ditch and crashing it.” (R., p.200.) Brown then fled on foot and was eventually
apprehended by “a KCSO K9 unit.” (R., p.200.) Upon searching Brown’s vehicle,
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officers found “several forms of common drug paraphernalia used to inject
methamphetamine and other illicit drugs.” (R., p.200.) Brown “admitted to recent drug
use and admitted to being the offender in the two previous pursuits.” (R., pp.200-01.)
He told officers that he “ran tonight because he knew he had a felony probation violation
warrant.” (R., p.201.) The state charged Brown with possession of drug paraphernalia,
obstructing an officer, and felony eluding, with a persistent violator enhancement, in
case number 44365. (R., pp.237-39.)
Brown subsequently admitted the probation violation allegations in case number
44364, pled guilty to felony eluding, with a persistent violator enhancement, in case
number 44365, and also pled guilty to felony eluding, with a persistent violator
enhancement, in case number 44366.

(R., pp.240-41, 257-58.)

The district court

revoked Brown’s probation and ordered the underlying sentence executed in case
number 44364, imposed concurrent unified sentences of 20 years, with five years fixed,
in case numbers 44365 and 44366, and retained jurisdiction in all three cases. (R.,
pp.265-68.) Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended
Brown’s sentences and placed him on supervised probation for three years.

(R.,

pp.272-76.)
Approximately six months later, Brown violated the conditions of his probation a
fifth time by failing to appear for drug testing on four separate occasions, admitting that
he was dishonest with his probation officer with respect to his substance abuse and that
he “had in fact snorted Suboxone about 6 times” in the preceding three weeks, being
“released from the Good Samaritan Program IOP House for smoking cigarettes and
being disrespectful” on March 13, 2016, being “terminated from the Good Samaritan
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Program” on April 21, 2016 “after he acquired too many absences,” and again
absconding supervision. (R., pp.277-79, 291.) The district court finally revoked Brown’s
probation and ordered the underlying sentences executed in all three cases.

(R.,

pp.294-95.) Brown filed notices of appeal timely from the district court’s orders revoking
probation.

(R., pp.302-13.)

He also filed timely Rule 35 motions for reduction of

sentence, which the district court granted by reducing Brown’s sentences in case
numbers 44365 and 44366 to 20 years, with only four years fixed. (R., pp.296-301,
338-41.)
Brown asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his
probation because he “does well in a structured environment” and wished to re-enter
the Good Samaritan program. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-7.) Brown has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4).
The decision to revoke probation lies within the sound discretion of the district court.
State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d, 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v.
Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 842 P.2d 698 (Ct. App. 1992). When deciding whether to
revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether the probation [was] achieving
the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of society.” Drennen,
122 Idaho at 1022, 842 P.2d at 701.
At the disposition hearing held on May 24, 2016, the state addressed Brown’s
“significant” criminal history, his abysmal performance on probation, the great risk he
presents to the community, and his failure to rehabilitate or be deterred despite
numerous prior treatment opportunities and legal sanctions. (5/24/16 Tr., p.32, L.10 –
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p.33, L.11 (Appendix A).) The district court subsequently articulated the correct legal
standards applicable to its decision and also set forth its reasons for revoking Brown’s
probation and ordering his underlying sentences executed. (5/24/16 Tr., p.36, L.21 –
p.38, L.6 (Appendix B).) The state submits that Brown has failed to establish an abuse
of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpts of the May 24,
2016 disposition hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
(Appendices A and B.)
Brown next asserts that the district court abused its discretion “by failing to
further reduce the fixed portion of his aggregate sentence” pursuant to his Rule 35
motion. (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-8.) In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not
function as an appeal of a sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within
statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Absent
the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion
cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v.
Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).
Brown did not appeal the judgments of conviction in these cases, and he failed to
provide any new information in support of his Rule 35 request for leniency. In fact, at
the hearing on his Rule 35 motion, when Brown’s counsel asked, “Has anything
changed between now and the time you were sentenced that would provide the Court
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with more information about why a reduction in your sentence would be appropriate?”
Brown replied, under oath, “Um, I -- I -- not that I can think of. … There’s nothing that’s
changed.” (8/1/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-23.) On appeal, Brown merely reiterates that he
would like to immediately participate in rehabilitative programming. (Appellant’s brief,
pp.7-8.) However, the district court was aware, at the time of sentencing, of Brown’s
desire to participate in programming, and it is not “new” information that prisoners are
most often placed in such treatment nearer to their date of parole eligibility. (5/24/16
Tr., p.34, Ls.3-17.) Further, “alleged deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is an issue
more properly framed for review either through a writ of habeas corpus or under the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.” State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520,
777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R.
35 motion). Nevertheless – and despite Brown’s ongoing criminal offending, abysmal
performance on probation, and failure to demonstrate any rehabilitative progress – the
district court showed leniency by reducing the fixed portion of Brown’s aggregate
sentence by one year. (R., pp.338-41.) Notably, at the hearing on Brown’s Rule 35
motion, Brown merely requested that the district court “consider reducing the amount of
fixed time in this case”; he did not specify how much of a reduction, nor did he request a
further reduction of his aggregate sentence beyond the one year the court granted.
(8/1/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.15-16; p.8, Ls.1-18.) Because Brown presented no new evidence in
support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion that his sentences
were excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed to establish any
basis for reversal or modification of the district court’s order granting his Rule 35 motion
for reduction of sentence.
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s orders
revoking Brown’s probation and granting his Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of January, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

DOCKET NO. 44364

APPEAL TRANSCRIPT
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31
l

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

MR. SCHWARTZ:

l

Yes, Your Honor.

No, Your Honor.

3 then you simply need to understand there won't be an

THE COURT! Okay. So I'll hear from the
2
3 attorneys , listen to their recommendations, then I'll

4 evidentiary hearing; the State doesn't have to prove

4 give you

S anything to me.

S you think I should know before I 11ake

If on the other hand you admit,

Do you understand that?

6

THE DEFENDAHT:

7

THE

COURT:

Do

Yes, Your Honor.
you need any more ti me to

OEHNOIINT:

U

THE

COURT:

No, Your Honor .

And Mr. Brown, do you admit or

15 HOnor.

DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR,

IS the plaintiff ready

Yes, Your HOnor.

State's recommendations,

I

16

He went down and did a rider at that time,

17 came back in October of 201S, and the court at that time

18 according to my notes did relinquish jurisdiction but

Yes, Judge.

19 gave him a week to either get into GoOd

And is the defense?

SotWARTZ:

Yes.

okay.

15 think that was on April 28th, 2015,

16
17 today to proceed to disposition?
MR, VERHAREN:

THE COURT:

14 his last probation violation disposition hearing .

I take responsibility, Your

I admit them.
THE COURT: All r ight ,

18

THE DEFENDANT:

8

13 to my notes, those doubts were expressed by the Court at

13 2016, Report of Probation Violation?
THE

7

12 about his ability to do well on probation, and according

12 deny allegations one through five on the April 22nd,
14

oo

9 Mr. verharen?
MR. VERHAREN: Looking through S()(lle of the
10
11 ~ore recent history, it looks like the court had doubts

9 whether you ad,ait or deny?
THE

my decision.

6 you understand that process?

8 discuss these al legations with Mr, Schwartz before I ask

10

a chance to tell .,. anything additional that

51111

or 24/7, and

20 I think that took pl ace and he was put on probation.

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And for purposes of
21
22 disposition, any witnesses to be called by the

Now he's back in front of you, Judge, on a
21
22 number of fairly serious probation violations:

23 plai nt1ff?

23 Absconding, using controlled substances, those types of
lilt. VERIIAREN:

24

THE COURT:

25

24 things.

NO, Judge.

I expect judging from the people in the

25 courtroom the defense is going to be asking you to give

MY defense witnesses?

34

33
l him another shot on probation through the Good sainaritan

1 very contrite about the situation that has led him down

2 progra1n.

2 this path .

He's had that opportunity before, Judge.

3 obviously chose not to take that.
4

He

He 1s a significant

public risk because of his pattern of eluding.

5 the cases were felony eludes with habituals.
6 looking at twenty years with five fixed .

TWO of
He's

Those , by

7 their very nature, put the public at risk.
8 s1gn1ficant criminal history beyond that.

He's got a
we've been

9 through this at least a couple of times now, so I think
10 at this point the court should relinquish -- consider

I think that when he gets complacent 1s when

3 he runs into these proble111S .

He needs to avail himself

4 of the support system the Good Suiaritan program

5 provides, and he understands that he's facing a very
6 serious sentence if he can't COIIPlY with the terms of
7 the Good Samaritan program.
8

If vour Honor is not willing to place him back

9 in the Good Samaritan program, then I would ask the
10 court to consider retaining jurisdiction again as

11 revoking probation and si11ply imposing the sentences.

ll reco-nded by the probation officer rather than sil'l!)ly

12

THE COURT!

12 imposing the sentence.

13

MR. SCHWART.::

All right.

And Mr. Schwartz.

Thank you, Judge.

well, Your

14 HOnor, I think the probation officer accurately
15 summarizes ..tlat happened here.

Mr. Brown did very well

Thank you.

13

THE COURT:

All r ight.

14

THE DEFENDANT!

And Mr. Brown.

Your Honor, I just -- I know

15 Good SUI program's probably a long shot.

I just hope

16 when he was in the intensive part of the Good Samaritan

16 that you could consider retained jurisdiction if

17 program.

17 anything.

once he was released into the outpatient

.I

would appreciate that very fflllch.

(Pause in proceedings)

18 program Mr. Brown got complacent and slipped up.

18

19

20 that the Good samari tan program does have a bed

THE COURT: Ttle warrant was served alffl0St a
19
20 fflOnth ago. Tell me how the warrant was served.

21 available for Mr. Brown today at 6:00 p.m., so we'd be

21

22 requesting that you consider placin11 hi• back on

22 work in sonners Ferry, and I got arrested by an officer

23 probation with the condition that ha complete the Good

23 up there .

24 Samaritan prograa,.

24

25

Mr. Padula is here today.

My

understanding is

Mr. arown has always been very soft-spoken and

Pages 31 to 34

THE DEFENDANT:

THE COURT:

um, I was on

iny

way back from

Where were you working in aonners

25 Ferry?
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1

THE DEFENDANT:

I was working out by, uh,

2 Oldtown cutting trees for a guy from the church by -3 Chuck Bernard.
4

THE COO RT;

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6 warrant.

It was only -· the warrant was put out on the

what?
didn't realize

had the

I

THE COURT:

Well, you'd absconded.

You didn ' t

9 think I wou1 d put out a warrant?
10

THE DEFENDANT:

Yas, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

I --

I

14

THE DEFENDANT;

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor .

How did you have a valid 11 cense

6

THE DEFENDANT:

7

THE COURT:

I

di dn ' t' Your Honor.

so your probation officer knew you

8 were drivi ng back and forth to BOnners Ferry without a
10

THE DEFENOANT:

No.

I

-- I

tw0

weeks before that.

12 my roo..,ate.

It says that , uh, he ha.dn' t seen or heard

13 from Ile and that I was staying at.

Your Honor , it was on the 20th

I was working with a

14 bunch of the guys from the church; cal eb Dagel, um,

15 of that month, and the warrant would've gone on the

15 Chuck Bernard, some of the guys there .

16 25th.

16 ba.ck and forth with these guys.

17

THE COURT:

was -- the

11 roo11111ate in here •• I was working with these guys, with

well, you'd missed a 111eeting with

13 your probation officer about

3
4

9 valid license?

11 111ssed a 111eetfng with the P.O.

12

Did your probation officer know

S to dri ve?

7 25th, and I got arrested on the 28th I believe.

8

THE COURT:

2 about that job?

I didn't realize I had the warrant.
I

36
1

well, your probation officer

17

THE COURT:

I was riding

who was d ri ving when you were

18 started cal ling you on April 13th and was unabl e to

18 pulled over and the warrant was executed?

19 roust you anywhere.

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

(Pause 1n proceedings)

21

TH~

You had a meeting on the 20th but

20 didn't show up for that.
21 before.

You stopped contact the week

so this job up in Bonners Ferry, were you being

22 paid under the tabl e?

COURT:

I

was, Your Honor.

Al l right .

I am going to revoke

22 your probation in al l three cases and impose the

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

25

THE DEFENDANT:

No, Your Honor.

23 sentences that have always been i11posed but suspended up

lillen dfd YCXI Start that job?
UII,

24 unti l now, so in the 2009-11957 burgl a ry charge it was

February possibly? March.

25 three years fixed , four years indetel'fflinate, total of

37
1 seven years.

In 2015-4987 e l uding for events that

38

1 You're driving when your license is suspended as a

2 happened February 16th, it was five years fixed, fiheen

2 result of t hose el uding charges.

3 years indetenninate, total not to exceed twenty, and

3 changing anything.

I don ' t see a rider

I don't ev8n see a rider with Good

4 that included the habi tua1 offender enhancement

4 Samaritan really being of any benefit, so I ' ll protect

S provision, and then in the 2015-2516 case, also el uding,

5 the public with the last remaining method that I have

6 for February 19th, 201S, events, five years fixed,

6 available to

7 f1heen years indeterminate, total of twenty.

7

That also

8 included the habitual offender enhancement provision.
9 All three of those sentences have at a 11 times run
10 concurrent , and I

a11

10

11 retai n jurisdiction.

12

You need to know that you've got 42 days from
r think my

13 today's date to appeal this decision.

MR. SCHWARTZ:
THE COURT:

13

("'4tt~r adjourned)

15 case, the 2009 case, 692 days.

15

17 matter.

Tbat's 1n the 4987

I might be wrong, I'll get 1t straightened out

17
18

19 2015 matter.

19

I'm -- as I just told the gentle111&n before

20

21 you, it's not ohen that I do this, but I don't see any

21

22 real significant change fn seven years.

22

23 pr ior riders.

You've had two

Yex1've had all sorts of treatment.

The

NO, Your Honor.

All right.

16

18 for sure, and then 255 days time served in the other
20

No, Judge.

on beha1 f of the defense?

12

14

On the -- it's 256 days

MR. VERHAREN:
THE COURT:

11

14 calculation's for credit for tine served on the oldest
16 credit for time served, I believe.

And any questions on behalf of the

8 State?
9

going to impose those and not

ine.

All right.

23

24 original burglary was a home invasion burgl ary, and then

24

2S the two e1ud1ngs were various serious activities.

25
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